We study the Medicare Part D prescription drug insurance program as a bellwether for designs of private, non-mandatory health insurance markets, focusing on the ability of consumers to evaluate and optimize their choices of plans. Our analysis of administrative data on medical claims in Medicare Part D suggests that less than 10 percent of individuals enroll in plans that are ex post optimal with respect to total cost (premiums and co-payments). Relative to the benchmark of a static decision rule, similar to the Plan Finder provided by the Medicare administration, that conditions next year's plan choice only on the drugs consumed in the current year, enrollees lost on average about $300 per year. These numbers are hard to reconcile with decision costs alone; it appears that unless a sizeable fraction of consumers value plan features other than cost, they are not optimizing effectively.
Introduction
Health-care systems with mandated health insurance financed from some combination of consumer, employer, and government sources are standard in all developed countries except the United States, where about 18 percent of the non-elderly population is currently uninsured (Gruber, 2008) , and many of the insured face financially risky gaps in coverage. The health cost of incomplete coverage is substantial: In comparison with other countries, the United States ranks 25th in the survival rate from age 15 to age 60, which impacts the population of workers and young parents whose loss is a substantial cost to families and to the economy. 1 If the U.S. could raise its survival rate for this group to that of Switzerland, a country that has mandatory standardized coverage offered by private insurers, this would prevent more than 190,000 deaths per year.
The elderly in the United States aged 65 and older do have universal coverage under the Medicare program, with prescription drug coverage (Medicare Part D) added in 2006. This may explain the somewhat better comparative performance of the United States for seniors, a rank of 14th in life expectancy at age 65. Since the U.S. has a population that at retirement has the poorest health in the developed world, this is a medical accomplishment, but it is very costly -U.S. health expenditures per capita are 50 percent higher than those in any other country.
Medicare Part D provides the Medicare-eligible population with universal access to a subsidized market for non-mandatory standardized prescription drug coverage through governmentapproved contracts sponsored by private insurance firms; see Bach and McClellan (2005) . This new market is representative of a trend toward "consumer-directed healthcare" that relies on consumer behavior and competition among insurance firms to attain satisfactory allocation of health care resources with limited government regulation, and is one model for more comprehensive reform of health care insurance (see Newhouse, 2004; Buntin et al., 2006; Goodman, 2006; and the references therein). Overall, Medicare Part D is considered a success story: Despite a rocky start, enrollment rates are high 2 , consumers have a broad choice of sponsors, and premiums are 1 These statistics are based on World Health Organization data for 2006, and U.S. Census data on population by age in 2006. 2 In the first year of Medicare Part D, more than 90% of the eligible population obtained prescription drug coverage, either from a Medicare Part D plan or a source with comparable coverage . eral health insurance exchanges that will implement the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010.
In this paper, we examine how well consumers did in choosing their Medicare Part D insurance plan. A number of papers have considered this issue, but mostly with rather specific or small samples, and also with somewhat inconsistent findings. Abaluck and Gruber (2011) use comprehensive pharmacy data provided by Wolters Kluwer that cover almost one-third of all third-party prescription drug transactions. They match these data with information on the characteristics of all the plans available to the individuals in the dataset. Abaluck and Gruber find that in their plan choice, individuals place more weight on plan premiums than on expected out-of-pocket costs. Also, individuals value plan financial characteristics in excess of their possible impacts on financial expenses or risk, while placing almost no value on variance-reducing aspects of plans. Ketcham et al. (2011) analyze a large data set from a "single insurer that sells Part D plans (PDPs) and administers PDPs sold by other companies". The data contain information on individuals' chosen and available plans, prescription drug use and spending, and other characteristics.
Their analysis focuses on the issue of whether the choices of Medicare Part D enrollees improved over the first two years of the Medicare Part D program in terms of reducing overspending, defined as "the consumers annual ex post out-of-pocket (OOP) costs for insurance and prescription drugs above the cost of the cheapest alternative, where the alternatives include other Part D plans as well as having no coverage". They find large reductions in "over-spending" from 2006 to 2007, which they attribute mostly to plan switching. These findings contrast with those of Kling et al. (2011) who argue that consumers' choices are subject to substantial "comparison frictions"
and arrive at a more pessimistic conclusion about consumers' ability to choose the best plans.
Our paper is the first to provide a comprehensive analysis of plan choice in the Part D market using a large random sample from the entire Medicare-eligible population. Our data, Part D claims records for three years, 2006-2008, combined with Parts A and B claims records for 2002-2008, have been provided by the Medicare administration (the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, or CMS) under a special data use agreement. These records give administrative information on plan choice, drug use, health conditions, out-of-pocket costs, and premiums.
The data on drug use are particularly detailed, thus avoiding the need to impute an individual's drug bill from self-reported survey data (as discussed in Winter et al., 2006) . Using these Medi-care A, B, D data, we study both enrollment choices in the first three years of Medicare Part D (2006) (2007) (2008) and plan choice among those enrolled, conditional on previous year's drug use, in the years 2007 and 2008.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data and the approach taken for simulating the relevant attributes of alternative plans available to each consumer. We use the administrative data on drug spending to characterize Part D enrollment decisions in Section 3. In Section 4, we present the analytical framework for analyzing ex ante and ex post optimization failures, along with the results. Section 5 concludes.
Data

Data sources and definition of working samples
Our study starts with a draw of all records from the Medicare denominator files for the 2006, 2007, and 2008, and (3) for those enrolled in stand-alone prescription drug plans (PDP), all prescription drug claims, including medication, benefits paid, total prescription cost, and copayments. 5 When an individual moves from one household to another, and is not a primary beneficiary in either, the HIC code assigned to this beneficiary switches to reflect the new primary beneficiary, and will no longer necessarily end in '0' or '5'. However, as of 2006 these individuals are tracked through the HIC code change, their claims are retained in the 20 percent draw, and their claim records under their previous HIC code are retained. We have not yet obtained full documentation of these procedures, and this description may be modified to reflect actual practice.
The 20 percent representative sample includes 9, 086,340 beneficiaries in 2006; 9,299,848 in 2007; and 9,530,609 in 2008. These shares reflect individuals with creditable or retiree coverage who are not enrolled in Part D, and individuals who move into Part D from non-Part D plans, in some cases because they become newly eligible during the year.
From prescription drug claims data to simulated plan choices
For each beneficiary, we observe a complete record of each prescription filled and submitted to Medicare for reimbursement in each of the years 2006, 2007, and 2008 . Each claim includes detailed information on the payment for the particular drug and quantity dispensed, days supplied, which tier the insurance plan classifies the drug on, the benefit phase associated with each claim, the national drug classification (NDC) code of the drug, and the prescription's date.
This information forms the beneficiary's claim history that will be used to simulate their out-ofpocket (OOP) copayments for prescriptions, and the sum of their simulated OOP copayments and premiums, which we call Consumer Inclusive Cost (CIC), in each of the insurance plans available to them.
Our simulation predicts a beneficiary's out-of-pocket spending among each available stand-alone Part D plan in his region. There are two main parts to this simulation: (1) constructing the formulary and benefit design (FBD) for each plan, and (2) running each beneficiary's claim history through these FBDs and calculating out-of-pocket (OOP) spending based on each plan's various rules and copayment provisions.
Construction of empirical FBDs
CMS data confidentiality rules encrypt the identities of plans in our Part D data. Consequently, we cannot assign published plan formularies from public CMS records to these encrypted identifiers, and are unable to calculate from actual formularies the benefits and out-ofpocket costs for plans available but not chosen. As a substitute, we construct an empirical formulary for each insurance plan that is the union of all the NDC codes of claims of enrollees in our Part D data who are in plans with the same formulary identifier in a specified year. The most popular formulary in 2007 had almost 900,000 enrollees, while the median formulary had 7,385 enrollees. The chance that a formulary drug will be captured by this method is low for uncommon drugs in formularies with low numbers of enrollees. 6 Thus, the assumption that only drugs observed with claims are covered by each plan's formulary may make the coverage of smaller plans appear less generous than in reality.
There are five types of Part D stand-alone PDPs. A Standard plan has an administratively specified benefit schedule with four phases -an annual deductible, an initial coverage phase with a 25 percent copayment, a gap or doughnut hole with no coverage between an initial coverage limit (ICL) and a catastrophic coverage threshold (CCT), and a catastrophic phase above the CCT with a 5 percent copayment. In 2007, the deductible was $265, the ICL was $2400, and the CCT was reached when OOP costs reached $3850, attained at a drug bill of $5451.25. These limits are 6 A drug ranked 500 in prescription frequency is used by about 0.21 percent of enrollees, and in the median enrollment empirical formulary is almost certainly captured; the probability is 1 -(1 -0.0021) 7385 . For the drug ranked 1000, the prescription frequency is 0.03 percent , and the chance of capture is 90 percent, while for the drug ranked 2000, the prescription frequency is 0.003 percent and the chance of capture is 19 percent.
adjusted by CMS each year. Actuarially Equivalent plans differ from the Standard plan only by substituting copayment tiers for copayment percentages, keeping benefit generosity the same on average. Basic Alternative plans eliminate the deductible phase, and are required to be at least as generous as the Standard plan. Enhanced plans offer two types of gap coverage, either full coverage, or coverage of generic drugs only, at the equivalent of a 25 percent copayment rate. Enhanced plans reduce OOP costs through the gap phase, so that higher drug bills are required to reach the CCT. 7
Our data identify plan types, and for each drug appearing in the empirical formulary of a plan, its branded/generic/preferred status classification and tier classification. Many beneficiaries in stand-alone PDP plans have one or more covered claims for drugs listed on a tier that is higher than the highest tier covered by the plan or a tier classified as "NA". The NDC claims for drugs so classified never appear on a regular tier in other claims for enrollees in the plan, indicating that they are in most cases benefits paid as the result of appeals rather than administrative coding errors or off-schedule purchases, such as replacements of lost prescriptions. After empirically examining the cost sharing associated with such claims by benefit phase, we assign "off-tier" claims no coverage in the deductible or doughnut hole, 25 percent coinsurance in the pre-ICL phase, and 5 percent coinsurance in the catastrophic phase. Roughly 20 percent of the sample has at least one off-tier claim so this is a pervasive phenomenon.
We estimate a benefit design for each plan based on drug classification, phase-dependent empirical tier copayment rate, days supplied, and the type of pharmacy that fills the prescription.
These aspects of the benefit design, and other elements that we take into account, are summarized in Table 2 . The steps described above then provide an empirical formulary and benefit design for each plan and year that can be used to estimate the annual OOP cost of any specified list of prescriptions supplied under that plan.
Simulation of OOP copayments for alternative plans
Each person in our working sample has realized OOP costs in the claims data in their chosen plan for the prescriptions they use during a year; we term the list of prescriptions filled their medicine cabinet (MC). To study the quality of plan choices, we must impute "what if" OOP costs in the available plans that were not chosen. To do this, we impute adjusted OOP costs from our simulation of the formulary and benefit design of each plan, and use these imputed OOP costs for both the chosen and alternative plans. The imputation avoids some anomalies due to tier coding and off-schedule drug purchases, and potential bias in comparing actual and imputed OOP costs, but also misses some payment variations actually experienced. In this imputation, each person's claims history is run through the empirical FBD described above for a particular plan to estimate their OOP should they have been enrolled in that plan. The simulations are performed on each of the plans in the beneficiary's choice set determined by the Medicare-defined region (of 34) in which she lives. When claims straddle two or more benefit phases, we split the claim into parts corresponding to each benefit phase and apply the associated cost sharing for that component. We make five assumptions about prescription drug utilization:
A1 Same order of drug utilization. Individuals follow the same order of drug consumption in each alternative plan as is actually observed in their chosen plan. Any substitution is based only on the type of drug, but not the quantity or timing of utilization.
A2 Sorting claims on the same date. It is common for multiple prescriptions to be filled on the same day. The order in which such claims are processed may be important for calculating a patient's OOP if one of the claims straddles two benefit phases. To achieve replicable simulation results, some sorting rule must be imposed for claims occurring on the same day. We assume that multiple claims on the same day are sorted first based on the benefit phase recorded in the beneficiary's chosen plan and are then sorted second based on the total cost of the drug (from low to high).
A3 Pharmacy choice to minimize OOP cost. In reality, the choice of where to fill prescriptions is likely based on differences in both OOP cost and convenience. However, we assume that beneficiaries will always fill prescriptions at pharmacies and in quantities offering the lowest annual OOP cost. Our assumption assures comparability in costs across consumers and plans, and to the extent that higher OOP costs incurred at local pharmacies or for more frequent refills simply reflect consumers' valuations of the added convenience, our measure is the correct benchmark for OOP cost comparisons.
A.4 Zero price elasticity of drug use. We assume that if a consumer uses a drug in their chosen plan, then they will use the same quantity and dosage of this drug, or a therapeutic equivalent, in any alternative plan, irrespective of price differences across plans and drugs.
A.5 Drug substitution. We simulate OOP costs under two alternative assumptions on drug substitutions. The first assumption is no drug substitution, so a specific drug used in the consumer's chosen plan would also be used if the consumer were enrolled in an alternative plan, even if it is on a different tier or is not covered in the alternative plan formulary. 8 This alternative may overstate the OOP cost of meeting the same therapy needs in alternative plans, and make chosen plans look better than they are. The second alternative assumption is that whenever a drug used in a chosen plan is not in the formulary of an alternative plan, then that drug is replaced in both the chosen and alternative plans by lowest-price therapeutic equivalents. The rules we adopt here are similar to those used by the CMS Plan Finder for calculating the costs of alternative plans. 9 Note that if a consumer uses a branded drug that is in the formulary of her current plan, and has a strict preference for this brand over an alternative brand classified as therapeutically equivalent, our calculation with drug substitution can understate the OOP cost to this individual of meeting her perceived drug needs under both the chosen and alternative plans.
Validity of the simulation
The simulation's internal validity is tested by examining the difference in actual OOP spending and simulated adjusted OOP spending (without drug substitution) for each beneficiary in their chosen plan. Actual OOP is defined as the sum of patient payments not reimbursed by a third party, all qualified third party payments, and patient liability reductions due to coordination of benefits from other payers. The median difference is $0, the mean difference is -$33, and the correlation coefficient exceeds 0.98. This compares favorably to a similar simulation check presented in Ketcham et al. (2011) . Figure 1 below displays the distribution of this difference for beneficiaries with differences less than $1000 in absolute value, which make up more than 99.5 percent of the distribution. The small size of these differences for most beneficiaries suggests 8 Under CMS rules, OOP payments for off-formulary drugs do not count in the accumulated "True OOP"
(TrOOP) costs that determine qualification for catastrophic coverage. Our simulation does not account for this additional cost of alternative plans. In practice, this will have little influence on our analysis, as plans requiring offformulary drugs are rarely cost competitive even without accounting for this potential added cost. 9 One difference is that Plan Finder asks consumers which pharmacies they would like to use, without providing any cost information, and then bases cost estimates on those choices. Our simulation chooses the lowest cost pharmacy to calculate OOP cost since we cannot observe the consumer's preferences for different pharmacies. that the simulation performs reasonably well and is likely accurate for predicting OOP spending in the plans not chosen. However, there are still some outliers for whom the difference between simulated and actual OOP is large. Figure 2 plots the empirical mean of simulated OOP cost against overall drug bill for consumers on various plans, and compares this with the designed standard plan benefit schedule. The figure indicates that the simulated benefits for Standard and Actuarially Equivalent plans conform well to the designed schedule over the phases where benefits are paid, but give somewhat higher OOP costs when drug bills are in the gap. This may be a statistical artifact, or may be evidence that consumers are being surcharged on drugs purchased in the gap where there is no coverage. The OOP costs for plans with brand and generic gap coverage show the expected reduction of OOP costs in the gap phase. The relatively higher OOP costs for plans covering only generics in the gap phase may suggest that branded drugs are the primary cost driver at that level of spending.
For comparability of chosen and non-chosen plans, we use hereafter annual imputed adjusted OOP costs of a medicine cabinet, with or without drug substitution, rather than a mix of observed OOP costs for the chosen plan and imputed OOP costs for alternative plans. An important measure for consumers is the sum of annual imputed adjusted OOP cost and premiums, which we term Consumer Inclusive Cost (CIC).
Enrollment choices
We begin our analysis of the administrative data on Medicare Part D by looking at the enrollment decision; this complements earlier research that used survey data such as Winter et al. (2009 , 2009 . The Part D program is heavily subsidized, with insurers reimbursed from government general revenues for about 75 percent of overhead and benefits paid out, with fairly tightly regulated formulary and benefit design and competitively determined premiums. As a result, the program is first-year actuarially favorable for most eligible people, even before considering the value of reducing risk and the option value of avoiding delayed enrollment penalties if a Part D plan becomes attractive in the future .
The marketing and information provided on Part D policies by insurers and by CMS focus on the expected benefits rather than on risk reduction. In particular, the CMS Plan Finder invites users to list current drugs, and then provides a list of available plans ranked by out-of-pocket cost if the current drug use continues through the coming year. While consumers could in principle use Plan Finder on a "what if" basis by introducing counterfactual drugs and dosages, it would be cumbersome to do this and combine the results into an analysis of expected plan benefits and costs. No information is provided on the likelihood that the person will have different drug needs, the ability of plans to meet these needs, and the reduction in risk offered by plans with more generous coverage. As a result, consumers are nudged toward lowest cost plans under the static forecast that current drug use will continue without change, rather than being nudged toward overall risk management.
This said, current drugs and annual drug bills are good predictors of one-year-ahead drug needs. The correlation of total drug bills in adjacent years is about 0.75, reflecting high persistence in patterns of use of individual drugs. As a result, persons with modestly high drug bills can expect to be ahead of the game by enrolling, even if they are not risk-adverse or concerned about the late enrollment penalty and future options. In addition, conditioned on this information there is significant risk reduction from enrollment. Figure 3 gives the cumulative distribution function of 2007 total drug bills. Table 3 gives descriptive statistics for this distribution, and also for the distribution of 2008 total drug bills, for the population that had full-year enrollment in a stand-alone prescription drug insurance plan in both years. The correlation of total drug bills in the two years is 0.7437. Figure 6 gives the probability, conditioned on 2007 total drug bill, that an enrollee in the standard plan will be ahead of the game in the first year, with benefits exceeding the annual premium. For 2007 drug bills above $690, this probability exceeds 50 percent. The probability peaks at a 2007 drug bill of about $5000, and thereafter declines slightly, apparently due to elevated mortality risk for people with very high drug bills. Figure 7 gives the expected cost conditioned on the 2007 total drug bill for non-enrollment, enrollment in a Silver (i.e., standard or equivalent) plan, and enrollment in a Gold (i.e., generic drug coverage in the gap) plan with a premium at the national average of Table 4 . While these rates bracket the 19.5 percent that the simple analysis above would suggest if consumers are myopic and risk-neutral, the actual pattern of non-enrollment was much more random, including many who left money on the table in the first year as the result of their enrollment choice. The earlier finding was that non-enrollment was concentrated among those with low but above-poverty incomes, low education, and relatively low prior drug use. The earlier analysis also found that when the option value of Part D insurance without a late enrollment penalty is taken into account, only a few percent of very old people with little drug use should rationally choose to not insure. Then, the observed rates of non-enrollment indicate that myopia and inattention are significant, and are reducing prescription drug insurance participation rates below levels that are optimal for individuals.
In our Medicare 20 percent sample of all Part D eligible people, Gold plans (combined with the relatively unimportant Platinum plans with full gap coverage) have a 9.4 percent share of those enrolled in Part D plans; see Table 5 . 10 Thus, Gold plans appear to be slightly undersubscribed relative to their first-year actuarial value. The complexity of the valuation of Silver and Gold plans, the availability of plans at national average premiums, consumer errors in assessing the actuarial value of gap coverage and focus on premium costs over potential benefits, and our assumption on the share of generics in gap purchases are factors that may contribute to this difference in predicted and actual market share. What the numbers indicate is that risk aversion is apparently not strong enough to offset the (perceived) disadvantageous loading of extended benefits.
The analysis above did not condition on the demographic variables available in claims data, gender and age. We find that drug use does vary with these variables, but that conditioned on prior drug use, they have little explanatory power. Thus, further conditioning on these demographic variables does not alter our general conclusions on enrollment. 
Models of plan choice behavior
Rational expectations and decisions
We make the reasonable assumption that at the time of their plan choice at the end of a year for the upcoming year, consumers know the drugs they have used over the current year, their health conditions, and their realized drug bill for the year, and they can calculate from public information (e.g., the CMS Plan finder) the projected CIC for each plan alternative they face and each medicine cabinet they may need. Since the open enrollment periods for 2007 and 2008 were mid-November to mid-December in the preceding year, this is a good but not perfect assumption, as end-of-year events that appear in our information measures may not be predictable by the individual, and no public source including Plan Finder makes it easy to carry through a sophisticated forecast of the likelihood and consequences of changes in health and drug needs. We assume in practice that the information that each consumer has in year t-1, denoted X t-1 , includes their age 10 Our calculations are based on 253,080 beneficiaries enrolled in Gold and 23,468 enrolled in Platinum plans and 2,936,066 beneficiaries enrolled in Part D stand-alone PDP. and gender, their medicine cabinet (MC t-1 , a high-dimensional vector that describes all the con- Each consumer is assumed to have sufficient information, from the CMS Plan Finder or otherwise, to determine the formulary and benefit design mapping, denoted CIC t = FBD(MC t ,k,t), for each Plan k available in year t in her region 11 , and to have, from peers or otherwise, a personal conditional density f(MC t | k,X t-1 ) of year t medicine cabinets given year t-1 information. From this, we assume that the consumer can deduce the conditional distribution of CIC in t given X t-1 and k, and its mean and variance
For a consumer with fully rational expectations, the density f will be statistically accurate. Consumers with less than fully rational expectations may have densities f that are not fully accurate, perhaps because they ignore available conditioning information or because they distort reality.
We assume that consumers have CARA utility functions U = (1 -exp(-γ + αCIC t ))/α, where γ is a term that can vary across individuals due to variations in wealth and in other risky opportunities, and α > 0 is a coefficient of risk aversion that approaches zero in the limiting case of risk neutrality. Rational consumers are assumed to choose plans k that maximize the expected value of U. To a first approximation for α small, this is equivalent to minimizing a certainty equivalent met. 12 Note that fully rational choice requires (1) use of all available relevant information to form expectations, (2) statistically realistic processing of information, and (3) plan choice to maximize expected utility. Failure of full rationality could come from violation of any of these conditions, and in general it will be difficult to identify the conditions responsible for failures.
Ex post and ex ante optimization errors
Observed choices and alternatives can be compared ex post, the realized costs from the chosen plan against the "what if" calculation of what costs would have been after the fact if the least inclusive cost alternative had been chosen. This allows us to describe consumer "regret" from a choice that in retrospect was not optimal. However, an ex ante comparison is more relevant for judging the quality of consumer decision making. This requires comparing expected utility of the observed plan choice with the alternative that maximizes expected utility, conditioned on the information available to the consumer at the time plan choice for the following year is made. This analysis requires specification of the information available to the consumer at the time of decision, and of the formation of expectations regarding the distribution of CIC for each choice alternative. Choosing a plan that fails to maximize expected utility, and the certainty equivalent expected excess cost from this failure, are arguably indications of failure by consumers to protect their self-interest, although factors such as a mismatch of the consumer's actual information and our information assumption, our assumption on utility, our assumptions on the formation and measurement of expectations, plan features known to the consumer and not taken into account in our description of consumer information, such as convenience of pharmacies in the insurer's network, and mistakes that are economically insignificant, may also contribute to behavior that we classify as optimization failures.
First consider ex post comparisons. Similarly to Ketcham et al. (2011) , we define ex post excess cost as the difference between CIC for the chosen plan and the lowest CIC for any available plan, given the realized medicine cabinet. This comparison ignores risk, in effect treating consumers as risk neutral. The ex post excess cost is an upper bound on the losses of risk-neutral consumers from non-optimal decisions, but it will not be a tight bound unless the consumer has perfect foresight on drug use in the coming year. More realistic ex ante assessments of the qual-12 Factors that could reintroduce an intertemporal element would be switching costs between plans, leading consumers to prefer plans with good expected long-term performance even if they are not first-year optimal, and non-separable intertemporal preferences in which habit and inertia enter the determination of consumer well-being. ity of consumer decisions reflect their ability to marshal and process the information available at the time they make a plan choice, to assess their own risk preferences and beliefs regarding future drug needs, and to go through a decision-making process that evaluates the utility of alternative plans and picks an optimal plan. This assessment requires consideration of the information available to consumers at the time plan choices are made, the manner in which they form expectations conditioned on this information, and the decision rules they follow given these expectations. We consider several models of information, expectations, and decision rules:
(1) Perfect foresight: In year t-1, the consumer forecasts exactly her drug needs in year t.
This model is of course unrealistic, but it should give a lower bound on excess cost which will be tight only if consumers actually do have perfect foresight.
(2) Static: The consumer chooses the plan that minimizes expected CIC, given the realized drug cabinet in year t-1. In effect, drug use in year t is expected to be the same as in year t-1. Let CIC Skt = FBD(MC t-1 ,k,t) denote this static expected CIC, and call it the (4) Minimum premium: A related decision rule prescribes that the plan with the smallest premium is chosen, in effect all plans are believed to have the same expected OOP costs, insofar as this is considered by the individual.
(5) Herding rule: Another decision rule that ignores CIC and OOP costs is to choose plans randomly, but with probabilities defined by plan market shares. This decision rule can be seen as consistent with herding, or with consumers picking plans because of their familiarity or salience (due to, say, advertising or endorsement by organizations such as AARP). The quality of herding rules depends on whether leader behaviour is opti-mizing, and whether followers have idiosyncratic characteristics that make imitation sub-optimal.
(6) Rational expectations: We assume that consumers form rational expectations, statistically realistic forecasts of µ(k,X t-1 ) and σ 2 (k,X t-1 ), for relevant information X t-1 , and that they choose a plan k to minimize µ(k,X t-1 ) + α[σ 2 (k,X t-1 ) + (γµ(k,X t-1 )) 2 ]/2, the certainty equivalent expected CIC. The rational expectations model is the ultimate benchmark for "good" consumer decisionmaking in our analysis, but is also richest and computationally most burdensome alternative in that it requires specification of the information in year t-1 available to and considered by the individual, and calculation of the conditional forecasts µ(k,X t-1 ) and σ 2 (k,X t-1 ). Because of the high dimensionality of X t-1 when it includes MC t-1 , it is impractical to estimate nonparametrically the conditional density f(MC t | k,X t-1 ) and use this to estimate directly the moments µ(k,X t-1 ) and σ 2 (k,X t-1 ). Instead, we use a "method of sieves" and a one-dimensional "sufficient statistic" for the impact of last year's medicine cabinet to estimate these moments semiparametrically. Our method does not take advantage of the known fine structure of the nonlinear mapping CIC t = FBD(MC t ,k,t), but with sufficient flexibility in the sieve specification we can recover the relevant aspects of this structure from the data. To implement this procedure, we assume first that the static expectation CIC Skt = FBD(MC t-1 ,k,t) is a sufficient statistic for the information conveyed by a consumer's prior medicine cabinet MC t-1 , and second that CIC Skt and a limited number of other demographic and health characteristics in X t-1 influence the conditional density of MC t through a single linear index H(k,X t-1 )β kt , where H is a vector of transformations of X t-1 and β kt is a vector of parameters for each plan and year. This implementation is also consistent with an "adaptive expectations" model in which consumers start with the static expectation and adjust toward the CIC for consumers with similar demographic and health attributes.
We consider a number of alternative "rational" decision models with various variables included in X t-1 , as described in Table 6 . These variables and transformations are defined as follows: adjust Medicare Parts C and D payments to insurance plans. 14 In each version of X t-1 in the rational decision models we consider, we use the method described above to estimate µ(k,X t-1 ), and σ 2 (k,X t-1 ), and then predict the choice k that minimizes the certainty equivalent conditional mean. We have investigated the effect of risk aversion by varying α in these calculations, but do not find evidence for a significant influence of risk aversion on plan choice. We report results only for the case of risk neutrality, α = 0.
For any of these expectations models, our primary measure of the quality (loosely speaking) of the consumer's plan choice is the ex ante expected excess cost, obtained by taking the difference of the conditional mean (or conditional mean adjusted for risk preference) CIC associated with the chosen plan and the alternative with the lowest conditional mean CIC in year t, given the information assumed available at the time of plan choice in t-1, and the model of how the consumer processes this information. In the case of the rational expectations model, these means are taken over the sample of individuals with the same information set in t-1. In general, one could use kernel or nearest neighbor estimates of these conditional expectations. In the current analysis, we condition only on categorical subpopulations, a simple form of nearest neighbor estimation.
A secondary measure of the quality of consumers' plan choices is the "regret" the consumer will have after the fact, given by the difference of the simulated adjusted CIC for actual 13 The 22 CCW conditions include chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and brochiectasis, depression, diabetes, glaucoma, heart failure, hip/pelvic fracture, hyperlipidemia, hypertension, ischemic heart disease, osteoporosis, rheumatoid arthritis/osteoarthritis, stroke/transient ischemic attack, breast cancer, colorectal cancer, prostate cancer, lung cancer, and endometrial cancer. For detailed information on the construction of the chronic conditions, see www.ccwdata.org/cs/groups/public/documents/document/ccw_conditioncategories2011.pdf We code the presence of each chronic condition as of December 31 of the year that plan choices are made.
14 For more information on the construction of the HCC score, see http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Health-Plans/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Risk_adjustment.html plan choice for year t less the simulated adjusted CIC for the optimal plan choice for year t obtained from ex ante optimization with a specified expectations model, both evaluated at the actual year t medicine cabinet. This is a retrospective excess cost for the specified ex ante optimal choice. This is an imperfect criterion for judging decision-making quality, except in the case of perfect foresight, as it replaces the ex ante difference in expectations with the difference of the CIC under the chosen and ex ante best plan, evaluated at the realized 2007 or 2008 medicine cabinets which are random draws from the empirical distributions of expected CIC. However, this measure averaged over a subpopulation with the same ex ante information will coincide with the full ex ante excess cost measure under rational expectations, so that across subpopulations with different information sets, these measures will be highly correlated. The retrospective excess cost will also provide a measure of "realized pain" that may influence the attention that consumers pay to their Part D plan choices, and may nudge them to consider switching plans.
Summarizing, we have three valuation criteria, ex post excess cost, ex ante expected excess cost, and retrospective excess cost; and in addition to the benchmark perfect expectations model, thirteen expectations models: static, diffuse, minimum premium, herding, and nine variants of the rational model with various specifications of the conditioning information X t-1 .
Results
All simulations reported in this sections are conducted for the entire working samples of 2007 and 2008 (data from 2006 is used to construct the t-1 variables that serve as state variables in the decisions made at the end of year t-1 for year t). Due to the large samples, statistical sampling errors are negligible, and are not reported.
We begin by characterizing optimal plan choices ex post. Table 7 reports the sample proportions of simulated plan choices (given data for t-1) that are ex-post optimal after the year t medicine cabinet has been realized. It also reports the sample proportion of individuals whose actual plan choice is better ex post than the plan choices predicted by our simulated decision substitution, these numbers change slightly. In general alternatives to a chosen plan will have lower cost if substitutions are assumed, but there can be exceptions when a drug is in the alternative plan formulary, but on a higher tier than in the chosen plan formulary, or when a drug in the chosen plan is much more expensive than the least cost therapeutic equivalent in this plan. A decision rule based on static expectations -essentially, following the strategy used by the CMS Plan Finder -does much better: The sample proportion of individuals who would have chosen the ex post optimal plan if they followed that rule is 41.7 percent in 2007 and 46.0 percent in 2008 without drug substitution; with drug substitution these numbers are 60.3 percent and 54.6 percent for 2007 and 2008, respectively. Interestingly, none of rational expectations rules does better by this criterion than following the static rule. This holds both without and with drug substitution. Rational models that include PFPCIC in X t-1 must by construction do at least as well as PFPCIC alone in terms of the criterion of minimizing expected CIC, implying that the gain from these rational models comes primarily from shrinking the upper tail of the conditional distribution of CIC. However, the additional gain is small compared to the gain from moving from actual to optimal choices under static expectations.
Next, we turn to actual choices. Corresponding to the numbers just mentioned, most individuals could have done better by following one of the rules we considered -those who show up in the "worse than" columns of the table. With a simple rule such as "pick the plan with the smallest premium", 68.3 percent (2007) and 71.1 percent (2008) could have done better. Even by picking a plan randomly, about a quarter could have done better than with the plan they actually have chosen. These numbers are for the case without drug substitution and even higher with drug substitution. One immediate interpretation is that individuals are willing to pay higher premiums for features of plans that do not enter our cost calculation, such as convenience. It will be easier to assess this interpretation by looking at the monetary losses implied by not choosing plans optimally or at least by some simple rule such as "pick the lowest premium". We turn to this analysis in Tables 8 and 9 .
An upper bound on the losses an individual incurs by not choosing her plan optimally is given by comparing the total cost of the chosen plan, and of the plans predicted by our hypothetical decision rules, with the cost that obtains for the plan chosen under perfect foresight. These numbers are reported in Table 8 . At the mean over our working sample, these losses are, for the actually chosen plan, $399 and $435 dollars in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Medians are lower at $249 and $327. To put this into perspective, the median loss as a percentage of realized CIC is 27 percent in 2007, and the mean loss is 30 percent. These are substantial numbers, but of course perfect foresight is only an abstract benchmark. Among the hypothetical decision rules we consider, the diffuse decision rule (random plan choice) and the herding rule generate higher losses at the mean and the median. All other decision rules imply smaller losses relative to perfect foresight than actual choices. Again, the static rule that conditions only on the current year's medicine cabinet when making plan choices for the next year implies surprisingly small losses of $137
and $105 at the mean, and $24 and $16 at the median (all without drug substitution). These low numbers are explained, in part, by the fraction of individuals with zero or low drug expenditures in both years. For example, just over 1 percent of beneficiaries have zero claims, over 9 percent of beneficiaries have claims totalling less than $100 in out-of-pocket costs, and almost a quarter paying less than the deductible. With drug substitution, the simulated losses incurred by following our hypothetical decision rules are even smaller, and zero at the medium for the static decision rule. Overall, the diffuse and herding rules do rather poorly -choosing one's prescription drug plan randomly certainly is not a good idea. The rational decision rules generate losses relative to perfect foresight at about the order of magnitude of the static decision rule.
Finally, Table 9 reports means and medians of the distribution of savings that the individuals in our working samples could have realized ex post by following our hypothetical decision rules rather than their actual decision rule. (The numbers reported for the perfect foresight rule are the same as in Table 8 .) Again, the static decision rule fares well: On average, individuals could have saved $261 or $330 in 2007 and 2008, respectively, had they picked the plan that is optimal given previous year's drug cabinet (i.e., if they followed the strategy used by Plan Finder). Medians are lower at $159 and $242 but still sizeable. In 2007, this translates into savings of 20 percent of the actual CIC for the mean and 18 percent for the median. Allowing for drug substitutions increases these hypothetical savings dramatically to $579 (2007) and $438 (2008) at the mean; medians are again lower. Even a simple "minimum premium" decision rule would have resulted in savings of above $100 per year on average. As before, the rational decision rules do, overall, as well as the static rule -some slightly better, some slightly worse. The conclusion here is that following a rather sophisticated decision rule that requires a rational expectations prediction of future drug costs does not, in this particular market, bring systematic monetary and thus utility gains, even if one excludes the potentially large costs associated with making such predictions.
Another important result of these simulations is that the monetary costs associated with the plans the individuals in our sample chose, relative not only to the perfect foresight decision, but also relative to the simple static rule are substantial -about $159 and $242 at the median in 2007 and 2008, even if one does not allow for drug substitution (with which they would be around $300 in both years). It is hard to reconcile these monetary losses-about 12 percent and 25 percent of realized CIC with and without drug substitution, respectively, in 2007-with just the implicit decision costs associated with using a tool such as Plan Finder. In fact, Medicare might take a lesson from Geico's popular advertisement for its car insurance: "12 minutes with Plan Finder could save you 12 percent or more on your prescription drugs." As suggested above, another interpretation is that individuals value plan features other than those we consider in our analysis, such as convenience and customer service. Tables 10a and 10b for 2007, and 2008, respectively. 15 The plan-specific explanatory variables are the plan premium and additional variables that capture expected costs, computed under the rules we just discussed.
We begin with the 2007 results (Table 10a ). The first specification (column 1) contains only the plan premium, the CIC associated with the plan, and the PFPCIC -that is, it corresponds to the static decision rule where predictions of next year's drug costs are conditioned on the drugs used in the current year. All three variables are highly statistically significant (not surprising given the sample size) and have negative signs. The pseudo R 2 measure of determination is 0.028.
The remaining 18 specifications (columns 2-19) include each of the 9 rational expectations CIC predictions, where the specific expectations models are those described in Table 6 above. For each of the 9 CIC measures, we estimated one specification that includes the premium, the predicted CIC and the variance of the predicted CIC, and a second specification that 15 The numbers of observations reported in these tables refer to the number individual-plan combinations.
They vary slightly between different specifications because of missing values in some variables that are used to construct the predictors.
includes current CIC in addition. Other than the variance measure, whose effect is not always statistically significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level, all other predictors are highly statistically significant in all specifications. As one would expect, the premium and (where included) current CIC always have a negative effect on the probability of choosing a plan (and the magnitudes of these effects are stable across the different specifications).
There are three specifications that have pseudo R 2 measures that are noticeably larger than those of the baseline and most other specifications (around 0.033 compared to 0.028 in the baseline specification). These are all specifications that include current CIC; the rational-expectations predictions of the CIC in these specifications come from models "rational 1", "rational 6", and "rational 7" -the models that use only sex and age splines, the CCW score alone, and the CCW score together with CCW conditions to predict the CIC. The other specifications which are based on rational expectations predictions that condition on the PFPCIC do not bring an improvement in explanatory power of the predictive regressions.
The results for 2008 (Table 10b ) are similar overall. Note that every coefficient reported in the table is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The sizes of the coefficients for the premium are smaller than those in the regressions for 2007, and they change their sign between specifications. However, note that in these regressions, PFPCIC and predicted CIC are included.
By definition, these also include the premium. So the coefficient of the premium captures the additional effect, which explains the sign change. Most importantly, as in the 2007 regressions, the largest pseudo R 2 values are obtained for the specifications that use predicted CICs based on the rules "rational 1", "rational 6", and "rational 7".
Conclusions
This paper shows that there is potentially great scientific benefit in using the detailed information on health, drug use, Part D plan choice, premiums, and OOP costs in Medicare A, B, D claims data. To deal with the inability to link encrypted plan information in the Part D claims data to CMS public files on plan characteristics, we have constructed empirical formularies and benefit designs using data from the sub-sample of individuals enrolled in each plan. This effort is successful in reproducing the OOP costs of chosen plans, and appears to be valid for calculating the CIC for both chosen and alternative plans.
Our analysis of enrollment and choice between levels of plan generosity suggests that the share of eligible consumers without drug insurance is in the range one would expect if risk reduction and the option value of avoiding late enrollment penalties in the future are ignored and the only criterion is whether enrollment is first-year actuarially favorable. In choice between Silver (e.g., standard) and Gold (e.g., generic gap coverage) plans, the evidence is that consumers are undersubscribing to Gold plans. This result is consistent with the finding by others (inter alia, Abaluck and Gruber, 2011 ) that consumers pay more attention to premiums than to benefit generosity, so that they are nudged toward low-premium standard or equivalent plans.
Calculations of the ex post costs for all available plans, without and with drug substitution, and of the optimal choices under various expectations models and decision rules for each individual, suggest that less than 10 percent of individuals enrolled in plans that are ex post optimal with respect to consumer inclusive cost (premiums and co-payments). Relative to the benchmark of a static decision rule, similar to the Plan Finder provided by CMS, that conditions next year's plan choice only on the drugs consumed in the current year, enrollees lost about $300 per year, on average. While these losses are rather modest when compared to the losses associated with not enrolling at all, an issue we have studied extensively in earlier research, they are difficult to reconcile with decision costs alone. It appears that a sizeable fraction of consumers either value plan features that are not reflected in total cost, or else do not optimize effectively. Our results then do not support the proposition that consumers can make and benefit from good choices in private health insurance markets, and direct health care resources to their best use. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of differences between actual and simulated OOP costs
